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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
even in the form of the judge's own notes, the open court exception has
been applied, and the stipulation enforced.4
In In re Estate of Meister,45 a committee for an incompetent sued
on her behalf as a third-party beneficiary under a separation agreement
executed by her deceased parents. An executor of the estate sought to
compel the committee to comply with the terms of an oral settlement
made in chambers and recorded by the official court reporter. In
holding the agreement "operative and effectual," the Surrogate's Court,
New York County, stated that "[t]he business of this court is transacted
with equal force in chambers. Moving the parties into the courtroom
which adjoins my chambers for the purpose of dictating the stipulation
would give the stipulation no greater weight."46
The court distinguished In re Dolgin Eldert Corp.,47 where the
Court of Appeals held that an oral settlement made in chambers was
not within the open court exception. In Dolgin, there was no written
evidence of the disputed terms of the alleged agreement, and the Court
suggested that the result might be different if the facts of the agreement
are undisputed and all the elements for an estoppel are present.4
In Meister, the committee conceded the existence of the stipula-
tion and agreement as to its terms, but sought to avoid it on the ground
that subsequent investigation revealed that the amount agreed to would
be inadequate to support the incompetent. The court refused to grant
such relief, emphasizing the interest of disposing of litigation through
settlement and compromise." The decision indicates that CPLR 2104
will not be strictly construed to the detriment of that interest, partic-
ularly when the terms of the settlement are clear, uncontested, and
supported by a written record.
ARTICLE 31- DISCLOSURE
CPLR 3101(a): Courts continue to differ as to whether plaintiff is
entitled to discovery and inspection of defendant's automobile liability
insurance policy.
CPLR 3101(a) requires "full disclosure of all evidence material
44 See Golden Arrow Films, Inc. v. Standard Club of Cal., Inc., 38 App. Div. 2d 813,
328 N.Y.S.2d 901 (Ist Dep't) (mem.), motion for leave to appeal granted, 30 N.Y.2d
486, 286 N.E.2d 926, 35 N.YS.2d 1025 (1972), discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 47
ST. JOHN's L. REv. 148, 164 (1972); Gass v. Arons, 131 Misc. 502, 227 N.Y.S. 282 (N.Y. City
Ct. Bronx County 1928).
45 72 Misc. 2d 459, 839 N.Y.S.2d 575 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1972).
46 Id. at 462, 39 N.YS.2d at 578.
47 81 N.Y.2d 1, 286 NX.2d 228, 34 N.Y.S.2d 883 (1972).
48 Id. at 11, 286 N.E.2d at 284, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 841.
49 72 Misc. 2d at 464, 339 N.Y.S.2d at 580.
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and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action. ... ." In
Gold v. Jacobi,50 the Supreme Court, New York County, construed
this language narrowly, holding that the limits of a defendant's auto-
mobile liability insurance policy were not matter material and necessary
in the prosecution or defense of an action and thus not discoverable.51
Thereafter, in Allen v. Crowell-Collier Publishing Co.,52 the Court of
Appeals concluded that the court possesses wide discretionary power to
determine whether information satisfies CPLR 3101 (a)'s "material and
necessary" test. Disclosure, the Court stated, may be had of "any facts
bearing on the controversy which will assist preparation for trial by
sharpening the issues and reducing delay and prolixity. The test is one
of usefulness and reason." 53 Despite this liberal disclosure mandate,
without an authoritative ruling by the Court of Appeals on whether
a defendant's insurance policy limits are discoverable, the several su-
preme court decisions in point have reached opposite conclusions.
Discovery of the policy limits was permitted in State National
Bank v. Gregorio,54 where the Supreme Court, Albany County, rea-
soned that since such information can be obtained by the trial judge
at a pretrial hearing and kept from the jury, there is little reason to
tolerate calendars clogged with cases which might be settled were such
disclosure allowed. The Supreme Court, Westchester County, also
adopted this rationale in Nolan v. Webber,55 wherein it rejected the
defendant's motion for a protective order denying such disclosure.
On the other hand, disclosure was denied on several rationales,
including the grounds that the policy limits were not within the dis-
5052 Misc. 2d 491, 276 N.Y.S.2d 309 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1966), discussed in The
Quarterly Survey, 42 ST. JoHN's L. Ra,. 128, 139 (1967).
51Id. at 492, 276 N.Y.S.2d at 311. The Gold court followed the allegedly restrictive
legislative intent of CPLR 3101(a) and felt that any change in policy was within the
province of the Legislature. The court also theorized that discovery might constitute an
"unconstitutional invasion of the defendant's right to the privacy of his papers." Id. at
493, 276 N.Y.S.2d at 311.
Discovery of the defendant's insurance policy is permitted when the action is in rem
and the policy serves as the res. Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d
99 (1966). Rule 26(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure expressly permits pretrial
discovery of insurance policy limits.
5221 N.Y.2d 403, 235 N.E.2d 430, 288 N.YS .2d 449 (1968), discussed in The Quarterly
Survey, 43 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 302, 324 (1968).
53 Id. at 406, 235 N.E.2d at 432, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 452.
54 68 Misc. 2d 926, 328 N.Y.S.2d 799 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1971), discussed in The
Quarterly Survey, 47 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 148, 170 (1972). The Gregorio court expressly re-
jected Gold and cited Allen as dispositive of the issue of materiality and necessity.
55 167 N.Y.L.J. 115, June 14, 1972, at 21, col. 2 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County).
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closure mandate of CPLR 3101(a) because they were not (1) evidence56
or (2) "material and necessary. ' 57
In Cummings v. Dominici,58 the Appellate Division, Second
Department, seemingly adopted the restrictive position by affirming
without opinion the denial of a motion for discovery of the defendants'
insurance coverage. When again presented with this issue in Fierman v.
Cirillo,59 the Second Department, in a memorandum opinion, reversed
the trial court's granting of the plaintiffs' motion for discovery as an
"improvident exercise of discretion." 60
In Mosca v. Pensky,61 the Supreme Court, Westchester County,
adopting Fierman's language, recently held that the granting of a mo-
tion for discovery of a defendant's liability insurance policy is essen-
tially within the sound discretion of the trial court.62 Examining Fier-
man and Cummings in light of the facts contained in their records on
appeal, the court interpreted them as prohibiting disclosure of the limits
of coverage prior to the completion of all pretrial proceedings, 3 stating
that "[i]mplicit in the Fierman memorandum is that discovery shall not
be denied as a matter of law." 64 In Mosca, the motion for discovery was
made after the filing of a statement of readiness, and thus the court
felt free to choose the better view after an independent examination
of the issue.65 Focusing on the "material and necessary" requirement
56 Sashin v. Santelli Constr. Co., 69 Misc. 2d 695, 330 N.Y.S.2d 522 (Sup. Ct. Ulster
County 1972), discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 47 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 148, 170 (1972).
The Sashin court recommended legislative action as the proper remedy for dissatisfaction
with the rule of Gold v. Jacobi.
57 Kevelson v. Maxwell, 71 Misc. 2d 498, 336 N.YS.2d 360 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1972). The Kevelson court also felt that such discovery in negligence cases might lead to
"litigious activities not previously contemplated." Id. at 499, 336 N.Y.S.2d at 361.
58 40 App. Div. 2d 765, 336 N.Y.S.2d 234 (2d Dep't 1972) (mem.).
59 40 App. Div. 2d 976, 338 N.Y.S.2d 285 (2d Dep't 1972) (mem.). Justice Hopkins
concurred specially based on Cummings. Justice Benjamin dissented without opinion.
60Id.
6173 Misc. 2d 144, 341 N.Y.S.2d 219 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1973).
62 Id. at 160, 841 N.Y.S.2d at 234.
63 Id. at 154, 341 N.Y.S.2d at 229. This distinction, however, is somewhat strained since
the precedents relied on by the appellate division in Fierman distinguish only between
pre- and post-trial discovery. See Sashin v. Santelli Constr. Co., 69 Misc. 2d 695, 330
N.Y.S.2d 522 (Sup. Ct. Ulster County 1972); Gold v. Jacobi, 52 Misc. 2d 491, 276 N.YS.2d
309 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1966).
64 73 Misc. 2d at 154, 341 N.Y.S.2d at 229.
65 The court characterized the granting of a motion for discovery of the defendant's
insurance policy as presenting only "a timing problem" in light of Fierman. Id. at 160, 341
N.YS.2d at 284. It first reached the question as to whether consideration of the plaintiffs'
motion was precluded by the Second Department rule which provides that once an action
is placed on the trial calendar by the filing of a statement of readiness and note of issue
no pre-trial examination or other preliminary proceedings may be had unless...
unusual and unanticipated conditions subsequently develop which make it
necessary that further pre-trial examinations or further preliminary proceedings
be had....
22 NYCRR 675.7. Justice McCullough declared this rule inapplicable to pretrial discovery
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of CPLR 3101(a) in light of its liberal construction in Allen, the court
concluded that the policy limits were relevant to the "subject matter"
of the case and that Allen mandates their discovery. 6 It also reasoned
that since the insurer is the real party in interest in a negligence action,
disclosure of the limits of coverage would permit the plaintiff's attorney
to better assess the depth of his adversary's commitment. Additionally,
the court found that such pretrial discovery in the sound discretion of
the judge would not serve to invade the defendant's privacy 67 and it
rejected the argument that the plaintiff's counsel might be tempted to
demand excessive damages if high policy limits were discovered.6 8
The settlement rationale for permitting disclosure of the defen-
dant's insurance policy limits is compelling, especially in light of CPLR
104, which mandates liberal construction of the CPLR "to secure the
just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every civil judicial
proceeding." Moreover, should this controversy reach the Court of
Appeals, defendants will find it difficult to overcome the force of the
liberal construction of CPLR 3101(a) mandated by Allen.6 9 Insurer
opposition to disclosure may well be reevaluated as carriers for co-
defendants and third parties increasingly find themselves in the position
of adversaries under the apportionment rule of Dole v. Dow Chemical
Co. 70 While the inception of no-fault insurance in New York may
reduce the urgency for change, the Legislature should not thereby be
deterred from amending CPLR 3101(a) to effect this needed reform.
CPLR 3101(a)(1): Perpetuation of a party's own testimony by deposi-
tion permitted on basis of advanced age.
Pursuant to the full disclosure mandate of CPLR 3101(a)(1), a
of the defendant's policy since its purpose is to eliminate unnecessary delay, and such
discovery, he averred, would not cause any delay. 73 Misc. 2d at 147, 341 N.Y.&2d at 223.
The court was also influenced by the proposed Westchester County Supreme Court rule
which would require pretrial disclosure of insurance policy limits in all personal injury
and wrongful death cases after the filing of a statement of readiness.
66 73 Misc. 2d at 159, 341 N.Y.S.2d at 24.
17 The court declined to endorse the theory advanced by some authorities that the
plaintiff is a third-party beneficiary of the insurance contract and therefore possesses a
discoverable interest, characterizing it as "appealing but somewhat tenuous." Id. at 155 n.4,
341 N.Y.S.2d at 280 n.4. See generally Jenkins, Discovery of Automobile Liability Insurance
Limits: Quillets of the Law, 14 KAN. L Rrv. 59, 71-78 (1965). The court failed, however,
to offer a superior argument.
68 73 Misc. 2d at 156, 341 N.Y.S.2d at 231. The court refused to impugn counsel's
professional responsibility. It noted that, realistically, since New York does not permit
indefinite demands for damages or verdicts in excess of the damages sought, plaintiffs will
inevitably set the highest monetary amount consistent with the injuries received.
89 See 7B MCKINNEY's CPLR 8101, supp. commentary at 7 (1972); Id., commentary at
11 (1970); H. WAcrrELL, NEW YorK PRAcncE UNDa TH CPLR 237-58 (3d ed. 1970).
70 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 582 (1972), noted in 47 Sr. JoHN's L.
Rav. 185 (1972).
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